Highway Politics in a Divided Government : Evidence from Mexico

Selod, Harris ; Soumahoro, Souleymane

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: GOVERNANCE;    POLITICAL FAVORITISM;    PUBLIC INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT;    INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT;    TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-8710
RP-ID  :  WPS8710

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

This paper combines local electionresults and geo-referenced road construction data over1993-2012 to investigate political bias in roadinfrastructure investment in a democratic setting, focusingon the case of Mexico. Using a regression discontinuitydesign, the paper finds strong evidence of partisanallocation of federally-funded highways to municipalitiesthat voted for the president's party in legislativeraces, nearly doubling the stock of highways compared toopposition municipalities. The extent of politicalfavoritism in highway provision is stronger under dividedgovernment when the president has no majority in thelegislature, suggesting political efforts to control the Congress.