Preferential Resource Spending under an Employment Guarantee : The Political Economy of MGNREGS in Andhra Pradesh

Sheahan, Megan ; Liu, Yanyan ; Barrett, Christopher B. ; Narayanan, Sudha

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: employment guarantee;    political economy;    project expenditures;    accountability;    transparency;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-7818
RP-ID  :  WPS7818

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

Are ostensibly demand-driven publicworks programs with high levels of safeguards nonethelesssusceptible to political influence? This conjecture isinvestigated using expenditure data at the local level fromIndia's National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme.Focusing on one state where accountability and transparencymechanisms have been employed and implementation effortshave been widely applauded, there is no evidence ofpartisan-influenced spending before the 2009 electionhowever a statistically significant but small in magnitudeeffect after the 2009 election. Most variation in publicworks expenditures is explained by the observed needs ofpotential beneficiaries, as the scheme intended.