If Politics Is the Problem, How Can External Actors Be Part of the Solution?

Devarajan, Shantayanan ; Khemani, Stuti

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: government failure;    political institutions;    development aid;    development;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-7761
RP-ID  :  WPS7761

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

Despite a large body of research andevidence on the policies and institutions needed to generategrowth and reduce poverty, many governments fail to adoptthese policies or establish the institutions. Researchadvances since the 1990s have explained this syndrome, whichthis paper generically calls "government failure,"in terms of the incentives facing politicians, and theunderlying political institutions that lead to thoseincentives. Meanwhile, development assistance, which isintended to generate growth and reduce poverty, has hardlychanged since the 1950s, when it was thought that theproblem was one of market failure. Most assistance is stilldelivered to governments, in the form of finance andknowledge that are bundled together as a"project." Drawing on recent research on thepolitics of government failure, the paper shows howtraditional development assistance can contribute to thepersistence of government failures. It proposes a new modelof development assistance that can help societies transitionto better institutions. Specifically, the paper suggeststhat knowledge be provided to citizens to build theircapacity to select and sanction leaders who have thepolitical will and legitimacy to deliver the public goodsneeded for development. As for the financial transfer, whichfor various reasons has to be delivered to governments, thepaper proposes that this be provided in a lump sum manner(that is, not linked to individual projects), conditional onthe government following broadly favorable policies andmaking information available to citizens.