Formulas for Failure? : Were the Doha Tariff Formulas Too Ambitious for Success?

Laborde, David ; Martin, Will

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: TARIFFS;    TRADE VOLUMES;    MULTILATERAL TRADE;    POLITICAL-SUPPORT;    TARIFF RATES;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-7303
RP-ID  :  WPS7303

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

This paper views tariff-cutting formulasas a potential solution to the free-rider problem thatarises when market opening is negotiated bilaterally andextended on a most-favored-nation basis. The negotiators inthe Doha Agenda chose formulas that are ideal from aneconomic efficiency viewpoint in that they most sharplyreduce the highest and most economically-costly tariffs.When the political support that gave rise to the originaltariffs is considered, however, this approach appears togenerate very high political costs per unit of gain ineconomic efficiency. The political costs associated with theformulas appear to have led to strong pressure for many,complex exceptions, which both lowered and increaseduncertainty about members’ market access gains. Where tariffcuts focus on applied rates, it seems likely that aproportional cut rule would reduce the political costs ofsecuring agreements. However, detailed examination of theDoha proposals with their product exceptions suggests thatnegotiators are likely to find cuts with exceptionspolitically attractive but economically costly when cuts arebased on bound tariffs with different degrees of binding overhang.