Civil Service Recruitment in Comoros : A Case of Political Clientelism in a Decentralized State

Rose, Jonathan ; Gowthaman, Balachandran

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: EMPLOYMENT;    CIVIL SERVANT;    COLLEGE;    GOVERNOR;    QUALIFIED PERSONNEL;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-7428
RP-ID  :  WPS7428

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

Professional civil service recruitmentis a core component of governance for development, as it isnecessary for ensuring the capacity of civil servants,service delivery, fiscal sustainability, and proper salarymanagement. Through an ambitious mixed method approach, thisstudy seeks to provide a political economy analysis of civilservice recruitment in Comoros—a fragile and decentralizedstate with a relatively large portion of spending ongovernment salaries. More specifically, it aims to explainthe recent dramatic increases in the number of civilservants in Comoros. The paper presents three main findingsfrom the analysis. First, in 2010, elections at the nationaland local levels were associated with the largestrecruitment in the past decade, due in part to the interplayof informal institutions such as political clientelism withthe current public financial management system. Second, theinstitutions involved in recruitment are not permanent; theyare evolving with the balance of power between the nationaland island governments. Third, civil service recruitmentrespects qualification standards.