The Seasonality of Conflict

Guardado, Jenny ; Pennings, Steven

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: FRAGILE STATES;    CONFLICT-AFFECTED STATES;    LABOR MARKET;    LABOR DEMAND;    HARVEST CYCLE;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-9373
RP-ID  :  WPS9373

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

This paper investigates whether pooremployment prospects of potential insurgents help to fuelconflict. The paper provides a new test of this"opportunity cost mechanism" using one of thelargest shocks to labor demand in agricultural societies:harvest. Theoretically, the paper shows that becauseseasonal harvest shocks are temporary and anticipated, theychange opportunity costs while keeping the dynamic benefitsof fighting constant, yielding unbiased estimates even ifthose benefits are unobserved. In contrast, many othershocks in the conflict literature are persistent andunanticipated, thus also varying the dynamic benefits offighting that confound estimates of the opportunity costmechanism. Empirically, the paper estimates of the effect ofharvest shocks on conflict intensity in Afghanistan, Iraq,and Pakistan using subnational variation in the timing andintensity of harvest driven by local climatic conditions.Consistent with the opportunity cost mechanism, the resultsshow that the onset of harvest usually reduces the number ofinsurgent attacks.