When Elites Meet : Decentralization, Power-Sharing, and Public Goods Provision in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone

Clayton, Amanda ; Noveck, Jennifer ; Levi, Margaret

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: CHILD HEALTH;    DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY;    ECONOMIC GROWTH;    LOCAL AUTHORITIES;    FINANCING;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-7335
RP-ID  :  WPS7335

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

Over the past decade, decentralizationof fiscal and policy-making authority has become acornerstone of development organizations’ recommendationsfor good governance. Yet the institutional design ofmultilayered government can create tensions as new elitesattempt to fill governing spaces long occupied bytraditional patrons. This paper uses the case ofpost-conflict Sierra Leone to explore the power-sharingdynamics between traditional hereditary chiefs and newlyelected community councilors, and how these dynamics affectthe provision of local public goods. The paper uses data onseveral measures of local service provision and finds thatcouncilor/chief relationships defined by competition areassociated with higher levels of public goods provision aswell as greater improvements in these goods between councilareas over time. Relationships defined by frequent contactin the absence of disputes as well as higher frequencies offamilial ties between the two sets of actors are associatedwith worse local development outcomes. This evidencesuggests that greater competition between elite groups isbeneficial for local development, whereas collusion orcooption between old and new elites harms the provision oflocal public goods.