High-Powered Incentives and Communication Failure

Mishra, Ajit ; Sarangi, Sudipta

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: TRADITIONAL TECHNOLOGY;    TECHNOLOGY;    KNOWING;    RISK NEUTRAL;    MOTIVATION;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-7345
RP-ID  :  WPS7345

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

This paper uses a donor-provider-agentframework to study the role of provider incentives for thedelivery of developmental goods like aid, credit, ortechnology transfer to the poor. The paper considers asituation where credible communication by the provider isthe key to successful delivery. The study shows that the useof high-powered incentives can lead to breakdown ofcommunication between providers and agents, leading toundesirable outcomes. The paper studies the interplaybetween incentives and communication in the presence oftypical and motivated providers and finds that in certainsituations incentivization leads to worse outcomes.