Should Developing Countries Introduce Antidumping?

Finger, Michael J.

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: antidumping;    trade policy;    WTO;   

RP-ID  :  111780

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

In Global Economic Prospects 1995 it wasexplained that antidumping is ordinary protection with agood public relations program. In fact, antidumping is oftenmore costly to importing countries than ordinary protectionthrough tariffs. The reason antidumping is such a costlyform of protection is that the threat of antidumping actionprovides leverage to the importing country to forceexporters into settled agreements which raise export prices.Exporters are frequently faced with the choice of having atariff applied against their export sales or agreeing toraise prices (a “price undertaking”)or limit sales (a“voluntary export restraint” or VER). Since exporters cantypically increase their profits with a price undertaking ora voluntary export restraint, they frequently prefer asettled agreement to the imposition of an antidumping duty.Sometimes simply the threat of an antidumping action willinduce a settlement because the uncertainty of theantidumping process itself will cause a loss of customers.These settled agreements, however,impose large costs onconsumers and importing industries since they do not provideany tariff revenue to the government. The effect on theimporting country is similar to the OPEC cartel: theexporting countries charge higher prices to the importingcountries through an agreedlimitation on sales or minimumprices. The difference betweenOPEC and antidumping is thatwith antidumping it is importing country policy that forcesup the prices of imports to its consumers and industries.