Democracy, Public Expenditures, and the Poor : Understanding Political Incentives for Providing Public Services

Keefer, Philip ; Khemani, Stuti

Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank

关键词: ABSENTEEISM;    ACCESS TO INFORMATION;    ACCESS TO RESOURCES;    ACCOUNTABILITY;    ACCOUNTING;   

DOI  :  10.1093/wbro/lki002
RP-ID  :  76748

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

The incentives of politicians to providebroad public goods and reduce poverty vary across countries.Even in democracies, politicians often have incentives todivert resources to political rents and private transfersthat benefit a few citizens at the expense of many. Thesedistortions can be traced to imperfections in politicalmarkets that are greater in some countries than in others.This article reviews the theory and evidence on the impacton political incentives of incomplete information forvoters, the lack of credibility of political promises, andsocial polarization. The analysis has implications forpolicy and for reforms to improve public goods provision andreduce poverty.