Banking and Regulation in Emerging Markets : The Role of External Discipline | |
Vives, Xavier | |
Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank | |
关键词: ACCOUNTING; ACCOUNTING STANDARDS; AGENCY PROBLEM; AGENCY PROBLEMS; AMOUNT OF COLLATERAL; | |
DOI : 10.1093/wbro/lkl002 RP-ID : 76761 |
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学科分类:社会科学、人文和艺术(综合) | |
来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository | |
【 摘 要 】
This article reviews the main issues ofregulating and supervising banks in emerging markets with aview toward evaluating the long-run options. Particularattention is paid to Latin America and East Asia. Theseeconomies face a severe policy commitment problem that leadsto excessive bailouts and potential devaluation of claims offoreign investors. This exacerbates moral hazard and makes acase for importing external discipline (for example,acquiring foreign short-term debt). However, externaldiscipline may come at the cost of excessive liquidation ofentrepreneurial projects. The article reviews the tradeoffsimposed by external discipline and examines variousarrangements, such as narrow banking, foreign banks andforeign regulation, and the potential role for aninternational agency or international lender of last resort.
【 预 览 】
Files | Size | Format | View |
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767610JRN0WBRO00Box374387B00PUBLIC0.pdf | 615KB | download |