Are Politically Connected Firms More Likely to Evade Taxes? : Evidence from Tunisia

Rijkers, Bob ; Arouri, Hassen ; Baghdadi, Leila

Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank

关键词: TAX EVASION;    POLITICAL CONNECTIONS;    TAX ADMINISTRATION;    CORPORATE GOVERNANCE;    CORRUPTION;   

DOI  :  10.1093/wber/lhw018
RP-ID  :  140497

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

Are politically connected firms morelikely to evade taxes? Using tax, social security, andcustoms records from Tunisia in which firms owned by formerpresident Ben Ali and his family are identified, this paperdemonstrates that connected firms were more likely to evadetaxes. Ceteris paribus, connected firms are 4.6 percent morelikely not to submit a tax declaration in spite ofregistering workers and/or customs transactions and 8.4percent more likely to report anomalously low sales whensubmitting a tax declaration.