科技报告详细信息
Mozambique : Can Information and Incentives Increase School Attendance?
World Bank
World Bank, Washington, DC
关键词: SCHOOL ATTENDENCE;    EDUCATION FOR ALL;    SECONDARY EDUCATION;    PRIMARY EDUCATION;    CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS;   
RP-ID  :  128153
学科分类:社会科学、人文和艺术(综合)
来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
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【 摘 要 】

Although more children than ever arestarting school in Africa, in many countries dropout ratesremain high and few students complete their schooling,especially girls. Results-based financing (RBF) has beenused in many developing countries to attempt to incentivizevarious stakeholders such as students, parents, and teachersto achieve better results. RBF mechanisms work by linkingfinancial incentives to measurable results, for exampleschool attendance, dropout rates, or student test scores.Conditional cash transfers (CCTs) are one such RBF mechanismthat has been used in many developing countries toincentivize individuals to take actions that they may nototherwise take, such as attending school or using preventivehealth services. CCTs work by giving individuals a cashtransfer, conditional on verification that they havecompleted the prescribed behavior. CCTs have been shown tobe effective in increasing school attendance in manycountries, but their cost and complexity makes themdifficult to manage for countries with limitedadministrative and budgetary capacity.

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