科技报告详细信息
NASA's Understanding of Risk in Apollo and Shuttle | |
Jones, Harry W | |
关键词: ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION; DECISION THEORY; DESIGN ANALYSIS; DISASTERS; FAILURE; RISK ASSESSMENT; SAFETY DEVICES; SAFETY FACTORS; SPACE SHUTTLES; SPACE SHUTTLE ORBITERS; SYSTEMS ENGINEERING; | |
RP-ID : ARC-E-DAA-TN60477 | |
学科分类:航空航天科学 | |
美国|英语 | |
来源: NASA Technical Reports Server | |
【 摘 要 】
Mathematical risk analysis was used in Apollo, but it gave unacceptably pessimistic resultsand was discontinued. Shuttle was designed without using risk analysis, under the assumptionthat good engineering would make it very safe. This approach led to an unnecessarily riskydesign, which directly led to the Shuttle tragedies. Although the Challenger disaster wasdirectly due to a mistaken launch decision, it might have been avoided by a safer design. Theultimate cause of the Shuttle tragedies was the Apollo era decision to abandon risk analysis.
【 预 览 】
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20190002249.pdf | 241KB | download |