CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL OF LEGACY FUEL FOUND AT 105-K WEST FUEL STORAGE BASIN

Jensen, M. A.

Hanford Site (Wash.)

关键词: Criticality;    C Reactor;    Dry Storage;    Uranium;    Prtr Reactor;   

DOI  :  10.2172/860878
RP-ID  :  KBC-24353-FP Rev 0
RP-ID  :  DE-AC06-96RL13200
RP-ID  :  860878

美国|英语

来源: UNT Digital Library

【 摘 要 】

In August 2004, two sealed canisters containing spent nuclear fuel were opened for processing at the Hanford Site's K West fuel storage basin. The fuel was to be processed through cleaning and sorting stations, repackaged into special baskets, placed into a cask, and removed from the basin for further processing and eventual dry storage. The canisters were expected to contain fuel from the old Hanford C Reactor, a graphite-moderated reactor fueled by very low-enriched uranium metal. The expected fuel type was an aluminum-clad slug about eight inches in length and with a weight of about eight pounds. Instead of the expected fuel, the two canisters contained several pieces of thin tubes, some with wire wraps. The material was placed into unsealed canisters for storage and to await further evaluation. Videotapes and still photographs of the items were examined in consultation with available retired Hanford employees. It was determined that the items had a fair probability of being cut-up pieces of fuel rods from the retired Hanford Plutonium Recycle Test Reactor (PRTR). Because the items had been safely handled several times, it was apparent that a criticality safety hazard did not exist when handling the material by itself, but it was necessary to determine if a hazard existed when combining the material with other known types of spent nuclear fuel. Because the PRTR operated more than 40 years ago, investigators had to rely on a combination of researching archived documents, and utilizing common-sense estimates coupled with bounding assumptions, to determine that the fuel items could be handled safely with other spent nuclear fuel in the storage basin. As older DOE facilities across the nation are shut down and cleaned out, the potential for more discoveries of this nature is increasing. As in this case, it is likely that only incomplete records will exist and that it will be increasingly difficult to immediately characterize the nature of the suspect fissionable material and its criticality hazards.