Hazard Analysis for In Tank Spray Leaks

GRAMS, W.H.

CH2M Hill Hanford Group, Inc.

关键词: Ventilation Systems;    Radioactive Waste Storage;    Storage Facilities;    Radiation Accidents;    Sprays;   

DOI  :  10.2172/803941
RP-ID  :  RPP-5990, Rev.0
RP-ID  :  AC27-99RL14047
RP-ID  :  803941

美国|英语

来源: UNT Digital Library

【 摘 要 】

The River Protection Project (RPP) Authorization Basis (AB) contains controls that address spray leaks in tanks. However, there are no hazardous conditions in the Hazards Database that specifically identify in-tank spray leak scenarios. The purpose of this Hazards Evaluation is to develop hazardous conditions related to in-tank spray leaks for the Hazards Database and to provide more complete coverage of Tank Farm facilities. Currently, the in-tank spray leak is part of the ''Spray Leak in Structures or From Waste Transfer Lines'' accidents in Section 3.4.2.9 of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) (CHG, 2000a). The accident analysis for the ''Spray Leak in Structure or From Waste Transfer Lines'' states the following regarding the location of a possible spray leak: Inside ventilated waste storage tanks (DSTs, DCRTs, and some SSTs). Aerosols could be generated inside a storage tank during a transfer because of a leak from the portion of the transfer pipe inside the tank. The tank ventilation system could help disperse the aerosols to the atmosphere should the vent system HEPA filters fail. This Hazards Evaluation also evaluates the controls currently assigned to the spray leak in structure accident and determines the applicability of the controls to the new hazardous conditions. This comparison reviews both the analysis in the FSAR and the controls found in the Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) (CHG, 2000h). If the new hazardous conditions do not match the analyzed accident conditions and controls, then additional analysis may be required. This document is not intended to authorize the activity or determine the adequacy of controls; it is only intended to provide information about the hazardous conditions associated with this activity. The Control decision process as defined in the AB will be used to determine the adequacy of controls and whether the proposed activity is within the AB. This hazard evaluation does not constitute an accident analysis.