VARIATION OF STRIKE INCENTIVES IN DEEP REDUCTIONS

CANAVAN, G.H.

Los Alamos National Laboratory

关键词: Military Strategy;    Targets;    98 Nuclear Disarmament, Safeguards, And Physical Protection;    Sensitivity;   

DOI  :  10.2172/784481
RP-ID  :  LA-UR-01-4596
RP-ID  :  W-7405-ENG-36
RP-ID  :  784481

美国|英语

来源: UNT Digital Library

【 摘 要 】

This note studies the sensitivity of strike incentives to deep offensive force reductions using exchange, cost, and game theoretic decision models derived and discussed in companion reports. As forces fall, weapon allocations shift from military to high value targets, with the shift being half complete at about 1,000 weapons. By 500 weapons, the first and second strikes are almost totally on high value. The dominant cost for striking first is that of damage to one's high value, which is near total absent other constraints, and hence proportional to preferences for survival of high value. Changes in military costs are largely offsetting, so total first strike costs change little. The resulting costs at decision nodes are well above the costs of inaction, so the preferred course is inaction for all offensive reductions studied. As the dominant cost for striking first is proportional to the preference for survival of high value. There is a wide gap between the first strike cost and that of inaction for the parameters studied here. These conclusions should be insensitive to significant reductions in the preference for survival of high value, which is the most sensitive parameter.