Safety and Nonsafety Communications and Interactions in International Nuclear Power Plants

Kisner, Roger A¹  Mullens, James Allen¹  Wilson, Thomas L¹  Wood, Richard Thomas¹  Korsah, Kofi¹  Qualls, A L¹  Muhlheim, Michael David¹  Holcomb, David Eugene¹  Loebl, Andy¹ 

[1] ORNL

关键词: BEARINGS;    COMMUNICATIONS;    DESIGN;    EVALUATION;    LICENSING;    MAINTENANCE;    NUCLEAR POWER;    NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS;    PROGRAMMING;    PROPRIETARY INFORMATION;    SAFETY NRC;    commun;   

DOI  :  10.2172/931809
RP-ID  :  ORNL/TM-2007/096
PID  :  OSTI ID: 931809
Others  :  Other: 401001060
Others  :  ORNL/NRC/LTR-07/05
Others  :  TRN: US0803634

美国|英语

来源: SciTech Connect

【 摘 要 】

Current industry and NRC guidance documents such as IEEE 7-4.3.2, Reg. Guide 1.152, and IEEE 603 do not sufficiently define a level of detail for evaluating interdivisional communications independence. The NRC seeks to establish criteria for safety systems communications that can be uniformly applied in evaluation of a variety of safety system designs. This report focuses strictly on communication issues related to data sent between safety systems and between safety and nonsafety systems. Further, the report does not provide design guidance for communication systems nor present detailed failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) results for existing designs. This letter report describes communications between safety and nonsafety systems in nuclear power plants outside the United States. A limited study of international nuclear power plants was conducted to ascertain important communication implementations that might have bearing on systems proposed for licensing in the United States. This report provides that following information: 1.communications types and structures used in a representative set of international nuclear power reactors, and 2.communications issues derived from standards and other source documents relevant to safety and nonsafety communications. Topics that are discussed include the following: communication among redundant safety divisions, communications between safety divisions and nonsafety systems, control of safety equipment from a nonsafety workstation, and connection of nonsafety programming, maintenance, and test equipment to redundant safety divisions during operation. Information for this report was obtained through publicly available sources such as published papers and presentations. No proprietary information is represented.