INL Active Interrogation Testing In Support of the GNEP Safeguards Campaign

David L. Chichester

关键词: ENRICHED URANIUM;    HELIUM 3;    KNOWLEDGE BASE;    MONITORING;    NEUTRON GENERATORS;    NEUTRON SOURCES;    NEUTRONS;    NUCLEAR ENERGY;    NUCLEAR FUELS;    PHOTONS;    PHYSICS;    PROBES;    RADIATION SOURCES;    REPROCESSING;    SAFEGUARDS;    SECURITY;    SENSITIVITY;    TESTING;    URANIUM OXIDES;    US DOT Active Interrogation;    Electronic neutron generator;    Safeguards;   

DOI  :  10.2172/927624
RP-ID  :  INL/EXT-08-14044
PID  :  OSTI ID: 927624
Others  :  TRN: US0804570

美国|英语

来源: SciTech Connect

【 摘 要 】

Active interrogation, a measurement technique which uses a radiation source to probe materials and generate unique signatures useful for characterizing those materials, is a powerful tool for assaying special nuclear material. Work at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) in the area of active interrogation, using neutron and photon sources, has been under way for many years to develop methods for detecting and quantifying nuclear material for national and homeland security research areas. This research knowledge base is now being extended to address nuclear safeguards and process monitoring issues related to the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). As a first step in this area preliminary scoping studies have been performed to investigate the usefulness of using active neutron interrogation, with a low-power electronic neutron generator, to assay Department of Transportation 6M shipping drums containing uranium oxide fuel rodlets from INL’s zero power physics reactor. Using the paired-counting technique during the die-away time period of interrogation, a lower detection limit of approximately 4.2 grams of enriched uranium (40% 235U) was calculated for a 40 minute measurement using a field portable 2.5 MeV neutron source and an array of 16 moderated helium-3 neutron tubes. Future work in this area, including the use of a more powerful neutron source and a better tailored detector array, would likely improve this limit to a much lower level. Further development work at INL will explore the applicability of active interrogation in association with the nuclear safeguards and process monitoring needs of the advanced GNEP facilities under consideration. This work, which will include both analyses and field demonstrations, will be performed in collaboration with colleagues at INL and elsewhere that have expertise in nuclear fuel reprocessing as well as active interrogation and its use for nuclear material analyses.