Risk-based decision making for staggered bioterrorist attacks : resource allocation and risk reduction in "reload" scenarios.

Lemaster, Michelle Nicole ; Gay, David M. (Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM) ; Ehlen, Mark Andrew (Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM) ; Boggs, Paul T. ; Ray, Jaideep

关键词: DECISION MAKING;    BIOLOGICAL WARFARE;    BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AGENTS;    RESOURCE MANAGEMENT;    ALLOCATIONS;    DISEASES;    PATHOGENS;    EMERGENCY PLANS;   

DOI  :  10.2172/993625
RP-ID  :  SAND2009-6008
PID  :  OSTI ID: 993625
Others  :  TRN: US201024%%17

美国|英语

来源: SciTech Connect

【 摘 要 】

Staggered bioterrorist attacks with aerosolized pathogens on population centers present a formidable challenge to resource allocation and response planning. The response and planning will commence immediately after the detection of the first attack and with no or little information of the second attack. In this report, we outline a method by which resource allocation may be performed. It involves probabilistic reconstruction of the bioterrorist attack from partial observations of the outbreak, followed by an optimization-under-uncertainty approach to perform resource allocations. We consider both single-site and time-staggered multi-site attacks (i.e., a reload scenario) under conditions when resources (personnel and equipment which are difficult to gather and transport) are insufficient. Both communicable (plague) and non-communicable diseases (anthrax) are addressed, and we also consider cases when the data, the time-series of people reporting with symptoms, are confounded with a reporting delay. We demonstrate how our approach develops allocations profiles that have the potential to reduce the probability of an extremely adverse outcome in exchange for a more certain, but less adverse outcome. We explore the effect of placing limits on daily allocations. Further, since our method is data-driven, the resource allocation progressively improves as more data becomes available.