Effects Influencing Plutonium-Absorber Interactions and Distributions in Routine and Upset Waste Treatment Plant Operations

Delegard, Calvin H.¹  Sinkov, Sergey I.¹  Fiskum, Sandra K.¹ 

[1]Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)

关键词: RADIOACTIVE WASTE FACILITIES;    RADIOACTIVE WASTE PROCESSING;    PLUTONIUM;    SAFETY ANALYSIS;    CRITICALITY;    CONCENTRATION RATIO;    CHEMISTRY;    DISTRIBUTION;    HANFORD RESERVATION;    SUSPENSIONS;    TANKS;    ABSORBENTS;    ACCIDENTS;   

DOI  :  10.2172/1228351
RP-ID  :  PNNL--23717 Rev 1
PID  :  OSTI ID: 1228351
Others  :  Other: 830403000
Others  :  TRN: US1600026

学科分类：核能源与工程

美国|英语

来源: SciTech Connect

【 摘 要 】

This report is the third in a series of analyses written in support of a plan to revise the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) Preliminary Criticality Safety Evaluation Report (CSER) that is being implemented at the request of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Criticality Safety Group. A report on the chemical disposition of plutonium in Hanford tank wastes was prepared as Phase 1 of this plan (Delegard and Jones 2015). Phase 2 is the provision of a chemistry report to describe the potential impacts on criticality safety of waste processing operations within the WTP (Freer 2014). In accordance with the request from the Environmental and Nuclear Safety Department of the WTP (Miles and Losey 2012), the Phase 2 report assessed the potential for WTP process conditions within and outside the range of normal control parameters to change the ratio of fissile material to neutron-absorbing material in the waste as it is processed with an eye towards potential implications for criticality safety. The Phase 2 study also considered the implications should WTP processes take place within the credible range of chemistry upset conditions. In the present Phase 3 report, the 28 phenomena described in the Phase 2 report were considered with respect to the disposition of plutonium and various absorber elements. The phenomena identified in the Phase 2 report are evaluated in light of the Phase 1 report and other resources to determine the impacts these phenomena might have to alter the plutonium/absorber dispositions and ratios. The outcomes of the Phase 3 evaluations then can be used to inform subsequent engineering decisions and provide reasonable paths forward to mitigate or overcome real or potential criticality concern in plant operations.