An Approach for Assessing Consequences of Potential Supply Chain and insider Contributed Cyber Attacks on Nuclear Power Plants

Chu T. ; Varuttamaseni A. ; Baek, J-S ; Pepper, S.

关键词: Nuclear Power Plant;    Stuxnet attack;    Natanz;   

DOI  :  10.2172/1329799
RP-ID  :  BNL--112742-2016
PID  :  OSTI ID: 1329799
Others  :  R&D Project: 21407

学科分类：工程和技术（综合）

美国|英语

来源: SciTech Connect

【 摘 要 】

This paper provides an approach for developing potential attacks on I and C systems of NPPs and assessing their consequences. An important concept is that the NPPs were not designed to cope with Stuxnet-type of attacks (and any other cyber attacks). That is, the plants were only designed for design basis accidents. The safety margins and redundancies built in the design are all based on design basis accidents. They may be helpful in mitigating cyberattacks, but may not be adequate.