Indirect reciprocity with trinary reputations

JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY

卷:317

Article

Tanabe, Shoma¹  Suzuki, Hideyuki²  Masuda, Naoki¹ 

[1] Univ Tokyo, Dept Math Informat, Bunkyo Ku, Tokyo 1138656, Japan

[2] Univ Tokyo, Inst Ind Sci, Meguro Ku, Tokyo 1538505, Japan

关键词: Cooperation;    Altruism;    Indirect reciprocity;    Social norm;   

DOI  :  10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.10.031

来源: Elsevier

【 摘 要 】

Indirect reciprocity is a reputation-based mechanism for cooperation in social dilemma situations when individuals do not repeatedly meet. The conditions under which cooperation based on indirect reciprocity occurs have been examined in great details. Most previous theoretical analysis assumed for mathematical tractability that an individual possesses a binary reputation value, i.e., good or bad, which depends on their past actions and other factors. However, in real situations, reputations of individuals may be multiple valued. Another puzzling discrepancy between the theory and experiments is the status of the so-called image scoring, in which cooperation and defection are judged to be good and bad, respectively, independent of other factors. Such an assessment rule is found in behavioral experiments, whereas it is known to be unstable in theory. In the present study, we fill both gaps by analyzing a trinary reputation model. By an exhaustive search, we identify all the cooperative and stable equilibria composed of a homogeneous population or a heterogeneous population containing two types of players. Some results derived for the trinary reputation model are direct extensions of those for the binary model. However, we find that the trinary model allows cooperation under image scoring under some mild conditions. (C) 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

【 授权许可】

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