A belief-based evolutionarily stable strategy

JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY

卷:361

Article

Deng, Xinyang¹  Wang, Zhen^2,3,4  Liu, Qi^5,6  Deng, Yong^1,7,8  Mahadevan, Sankaran⁸ 

[1] Southwest Univ, Sch Comp & Informat Sci, Chongqing 400715, Peoples R China

[2] Hong Kong Baptist Univ, Dept Phys, Kowloon, Hong Kong, Peoples R China

[3] Beijing Hong Kong Singapore Joint Ctr Nonlinear &, Ctr Nonlinear Studies, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China

[4] Hong Kong Baptist Univ, Inst Computat & Theoret Studies, Kowloon, Hong Kong, Peoples R China

[5] Vanderbilt Univ, Sch Med, Ctr Quantitat Sci, Nashville, TN 37232 USA

[6] Vanderbilt Univ, Sch Med, Dept Biomed Informat, Nashville, TN 37232 USA

[7] Northwestern Polytech Univ, Sch Automat, Xian 710072, Peoples R China

[8] Vanderbilt Univ, Sch Engn, Nashville, TN 37235 USA

关键词: Evolutionary game;    Mixed strategy;    Dempster-Shafer evidence theory;    Belief function;   

DOI  :  10.1016/j.jtbi.2014.07.009

来源: Elsevier

【 摘 要 】

As an equilibrium refinement of the Nash equilibrium, evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is a key concept in evolutionary game theory and has attracted growing interest. An ESS can be either a pure strategy or a mixed strategy. Even though the randomness is allowed in mixed strategy, the selection probability of pure strategy in a mixed strategy may fluctuate due to the impact of many factors. The fluctuation can lead to more uncertainty. In this paper, such uncertainty involved in mixed strategy has been further taken into consideration: a belief strategy is proposed in terms of Dempster-Shafer evidence theory. Furthermore, based on the proposed belief strategy, a belief-based ESS has been developed. The belief strategy and belief-based ESS can reduce to the mixed strategy and mixed ESS, which provide more realistic and powerful tools to describe interactions among agents. (C) 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

【 授权许可】

Free