Seven rules to avoid the tragedy of the commons

JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY

卷:449

Article

Murase, Yohsuke¹  Baek, Seung Ki² 

[1] RIKEN, Ctr Computat Sci, Kobe, Hyogo 6500047, Japan

[2] Pukyong Natl Univ, Dept Phys, Busan 48513, South Korea

关键词: Evolution of cooperation;    Public-goods game;    Reciprocity;   

DOI  :  10.1016/j.jtbi.2018.04.027

来源: Elsevier

【 摘 要 】

Cooperation among seif-interested players in a social dilemma is fragile and easily interrupted by mistakes. In this work, we study the repeated n-person public-goods game and search for a strategy that forms a cooperative Nash equilibrium in the presence of implementation error with a guarantee that the resulting payoff will be no less than any of the co-players'. By enumerating strategic possibilities for n = 3, we show that such a strategy indeed exists when its memory length m equals three. It means that a deterministic strategy can be publicly employed to stabilize cooperation against error with avoiding the risk of being exploited. We furthermore show that, for general n-person public-goods game, m >= n is necessary to satisfy the above criteria. (C) 2018 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd.

【 授权许可】

Free