The evolution of reciprocity in sizable human groups

JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY

卷:257

Article

Rothschild, Casey G.¹ 

[1] Middlebury Coll, Dept Econ, Middlebury, VT 05753 USA

关键词: Human cooperation;    Group selection;    Reciprocal altruism;    Sapience;   

DOI  :  10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.01.004

来源: Elsevier

【 摘 要 】

The scale and complexity of human cooperation is an important and unresolved evolutionary puzzle. This article uses the finitely repeated n person Prisoners' Dilemma game to illustrate how sapience can greatly enhance group-selection effects and lead to the evolutionary stability of cooperation in large groups. This affords a simple and direct explanation of the human exception. (C) 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

【 授权许可】

Free