Market equilibriums for transport operators with several goals

European Transport Research Review

Original Paper

Finn Jørgensen¹  Terje Andreas Mathisen¹ 

[1] University of Nordland, Bodø Graduate School of Business, NO-8049, Bodø, Norway;

关键词: Collusion;    Equilibrium prices;    Goal functions;    Passenger transport;    Price competition;    Quantity competition;   

DOI  :  10.1007/s12544-013-0125-x

 received in 2013-01-24, accepted in 2013-10-27,  发布年份 2013

来源: Springer

【 摘 要 】

PurposeThe paper addresses a transport market consisting of two firms with goals extending beyond pure profit maximisation. Considering that transport companies often have public owners and that managers have different objective that the owners, it is argued the firms maximise a weighted sum of profits, revenues and total consumer surplus.MethodsThe paper analyses equilibrium fares and quantities arising from collusion and competition on price (Bertrand) and quantity (Cournot), when the firms produce symmetrically differentiable services and have identical cost and goal functions.ResultsSpecial focus is given to analyzing how the firms’ costs, the degree of substitutability and complementarity between their services and their goal functions influence equilibrium prices in the three different competitive situations. The influence of parameters included in the model regarding the differences between the equilibrium prices is also addressed.ConclusionsThe study provides relevant knowledge for transport authorities of how transport firms respond to changes in competitive regimes depending on their objectives and competitive situation.

【 授权许可】

Unknown   
© The Author(s) 2013