Effects of asymmetric medical insurance subsidy on hospitals competition under non-price regulation

International Journal for Equity in Health

Research

Pu-yan Nie¹  Chan Wang² 

[1] Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 510320, Guangzhou, People’s Republic of China;Institute of Industrial Economics, Jinan University, 510632, Guangzhou, People’s Republic of China;

关键词: Quality competition;    Medical insurance subsidy;    Management efficiency;    Game theory;    I11;    L51;    I13;   

DOI  :  10.1186/s12939-016-0468-8

 received in 2016-08-05, accepted in 2016-10-31,  发布年份 2016

来源: Springer

【 摘 要 】

BackgroundPoor medical care and high fees are two major problems in the world health care system. As a result, health care insurance system reform is a major issue in developing countries, such as China. Governments should take the effect of health care insurance system reform on the competition of hospitals into account when they practice a reform. This article aims to capture the influences of asymmetric medical insurance subsidy and the importance of medical quality to patients on hospitals competition under non-price regulation.MethodsWe establish a three-stage duopoly model with quantity and quality competition. In the model, qualitative difference and asymmetric medical insurance subsidy among hospitals are considered. The government decides subsidy (or reimbursement) ratios in the first stage. Hospitals choose the quality in the second stage and then support the quantity in the third stage. We obtain our conclusions by mathematical model analyses and all the results are achieved by backward induction.ResultsThe importance of medical quality to patients has stronger influence on the small hospital, while subsidy has greater effect on the large hospital. Meanwhile, the importance of medical quality to patients strengthens competition, but subsidy effect weakens it. Besides, subsidy ratios difference affects the relationship between subsidy and hospital competition. Furthermore, we capture the optimal reimbursement ratio based on social welfare maximization. More importantly, this paper finds that the higher management efficiency of the medical insurance investment funds is, the higher the best subsidy ratio is.ConclusionsThis paper states that subsidy is a two-edged sword. On one hand, subsidy stimulates medical demand. On the other hand, subsidy raises price and inhibits hospital competition. Therefore, government must set an appropriate subsidy ratio difference between large and small hospitals to maximize the total social welfare. For a developing country with limited medical resources and great difference in hospitals such as China, adjusting the reimbursement ratios between different level hospitals and increasing medical quality are two reasonable methods for the sustainable development of its health system.

【 授权许可】

CC BY   
© The Author(s). 2016

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