Assessment of core capacities for the International Health Regulations (IHR[2005]) – Uganda, 2009

BMC Public Health

Review

Julius J Lutwama¹  Joseph F Wamala¹  Barnabas Bakamutumaho¹  Issa Makumbi¹  Fernando Da Silveira²  Thomas Aisu²  Peter Gaturuku²  Miriam Nanyunja³  Nasan Natseri³  Annet Kisakye³  Charles Okot³  Rajesh Sreedharan⁴  Stella Chungong⁴  Jun Xing⁴ 

[1] Ministry of Health, P.O. Box 7272, Kampala, Uganda;World Health Organisation - Regional Office for Africa, Cité du Djoué, P.O. Box 06, Brazzaville, Republic of Congo;World Health Organisation Country Office, P.O. Box 24578, Plot 60, Prince Charles Drive, Kampala;World Health Organisation Headquarters, Avenue Appia 20, 1211, Geneva 27, Switzerland;

关键词: Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome;    Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome;    Public Health Emergency;    Rapid Response Team;    Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Outbreak;   

DOI  :  10.1186/1471-2458-10-S1-S9

来源: Springer

【 摘 要 】

BackgroundUganda is currently implementing the International Health Regulations (IHR[2005]) within the context of Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR). The IHR(2005) require countries to assess the ability of their national structures, capacities, and resources to meet the minimum requirements for surveillance and response. This report describes the results of the assessment undertaken in Uganda.MethodsWe conducted a descriptive cross-sectional assessment using the protocol developed by the World Health Organisation (WHO). The data collection tools were adapted locally and administered to a convenience sample of HR(2005) stakeholders, and frequency analyses were performed.ResultsUgandan national laws relevant to the IHR(2005) existed, but they did not adequately support the full implementation of the IHR(2005). Correspondingly, there was a designated IHR National Focal Point (NFP), but surveillance activities and operational communications were limited to the health sector. All the districts (13/13) had designated disease surveillance offices, most had IDSR technical guidelines (92%, or 12/13), and all (13/13) had case definitions for infectious and zoonotic diseases surveillance. Surveillance guidelines were available at 57% (35/61) of the health facilities, while case definitions were available at 66% (40/61) of the health facilities. The priority diseases list, surveillance guidelines, case definitions and reporting tools were based on the IDSR strategy and hence lacked information on the IHR(2005). The rapid response teams at national and district levels lacked food safety, chemical and radio-nuclear experts. Similarly, there were no guidelines on the outbreak response to food, chemical and radio-nuclear hazards. Comprehensive preparedness plans incorporating IHR(2005) were lacking at national and district levels. A national laboratory policy existed and the strategic plan was being drafted. However, there were critical gaps hampering the efficient functioning of the national laboratory network. Finally, the points of entry for IHR(2005) implementation had not been designated.ConclusionsThe assessment highlighted critical gaps to guide the IHR(2005) planning process. The IHR(2005) action plan should therefore be developed to foster national and international public health security.

【 授权许可】

CC BY   
© Wamala et al; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. 2010