Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: An equivalence

卷:139

Article

关键词: MECHANISM DESIGN;    INFORMATIONAL SIZE;    DOUBLE AUCTION;    SIMPLE MARKET;    AMBIGUITY;    EFFICIENCY;    CONVERGENCE;    COMMUNICATION;    RANDOMIZATION;    UNCERTAINTY;   

DOI  :  10.1016/j.geb.2023.01.012

来源: SCIE

【 摘 要 】

This paper provides a micro-foundation for approximate incentive compatibility using ambiguity aversion. In particular, we propose a novel notion of approximate interim incentive compatibility, approximate local incentive compatibility, and establish an equivalence between approximate local incentive compatibility in a Bayesian environment and exact interim incentive compatibility in the presence of a small degree of ambiguity. We then apply our result to the implementation of efficient allocations. In particular, we identify two economic settings-including ones in which approximately efficient allocations are implementable and ones in which agents are informationally small-in which efficient allocations are approximately locally implementable when agents are Bayesian. Applying our result to those settings, we conclude that efficient allocations are exactly implementable when agents perceive a small degree of ambiguity.(c) 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

【 授权许可】

Free