Fairness for multi-self agents

卷:141

Article

关键词: EGALITARIAN-EQUIVALENT ALLOCATIONS;    UTILITY REPRESENTATION;    ECONOMIC-THEORY;    ENVY-FREE;    PREFERENCE;    CHOICE;    EXISTENCE;    EQUITY;    THEOREM;   

DOI  :  10.1016/j.geb.2023.06.004

来源: SCIE

【 摘 要 】

Are fairness and efficiency compatible in behavioral welfare economics? Assuming multi-self agents, who may not be able to integrate their various objectives into complete and transitive rankings, we call an allocation unambiguously-fair if it fair according to every self of every agent. We show that efficiency is generically compatible with the unambiguous fair-share guarantee, and - in two agent economies - with unambiguous no-envy. But in some larger economies, no efficient allocation satisfies unambiguous no-envy or unambiguous egalitarian equivalence. These non-existence results persist if the agents integrate their objectives into complete but intransitive rankings. Even if unambiguously envy-free Pareto optima exist, they may not arise as market equilibria from equal endowments. Finally, we show that there are Pareto optima with the unambiguous fair-share guarantee that are envy-free for at least one complete and transitive aggregation of the agents' preferences, and others that are egalitarian-equivalent according to at least one such aggregation. & COPY; 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

【 授权许可】

Free