The team allocator game: Allocation power in public goods games

卷:140

Article

关键词: TACIT COORDINATION GAMES;    WEAKEST-LINK;    VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS;    BEST-SHOT;    COOPERATION;    FAIRNESS;    RECIPROCITY;    PROVISION;    ORIENTATIONS;    PUNISHMENT;   

DOI  :  10.1016/j.geb.2023.02.005

来源: SCIE

【 摘 要 】

We analyze linear, weakest-link and best-shot public goods games where a distinguished team member, the team allocator, has property rights over the benefits from the public good to distribute it among team members. Our team allocator games are intended to cap-ture natural asymmetries in hierarchical teams facing social dilemmas, such as those in work teams. We show that introducing a team allocator leads to increased contributions in linear and best-shot public-good games. No effect can be found in the weakest-link pub-lic good. The team allocator uses her power to distribute benefits in a way that motivates people to contribute. Re-allocating team payoffs allows her to reward contributing team members and to sanction non-cooperating members at no efficiency losses from explicit sanctioning costs. Thus, team profits are higher in the linear team allocator game but not in the best-shot case, where coordination problems lower the welfare for the remaining team members.(c) 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

【 授权许可】

Free