| 卷:39 | |
| Negotiation mechanism of carbon emission quota trading process | |
| Article | |
| 关键词: SELLER GAME MODEL; BILATERAL NEGOTIATION; ALLOCATION; CHINA; FRAMEWORK; SELECTION; OPPONENT; DESIGN; | |
| DOI : 10.1016/j.spc.2023.05.010 | |
| 来源: SCIE | |
【 摘 要 】
Carbon emission quota trading is an effective method for realizing carbon neutrality. Negotiation can help to effectively resolve the differences and conflicts among the trading parties in the carbon emission quota trading process. For researching the negotiation mechanism of carbon emission quota trade, we construct the agent negotiation model that introduces the risk appetite of negotiator and Bayesian algorithm. And then, the nego-tiation protocol is analyzed, including offer tactics, negotiation unity and termination condition. The experi-mental studies are given to simulate the negotiation of carbon emission quota trading process for demonstrating the validity of the negotiation model and tactics. This study demonstrates the impact of risk appetite on nego-tiation in the carbon emission quota trading. And can help to improve negotiation efficiency, achieve win-win and accurate matching among the trading parties of carbon emission quota.
【 授权许可】
Free