Research on false information clarification mechanism among government, opinion leaders, and Internet users — Based on differential game theory

Frontiers in Psychology

article

Bowen Li¹  Hua Li²  Qiubai Sun²  Rongjian Lv¹ 

[1] School of Electronic and Information Engineering, University of Science and Technology Liaoning;School of Business Administration, University of Science and Technology Liaoning

关键词: Differential game;    False Information Classification System;    Major emergencies;    optimal control;    opinion leaders;   

DOI  :  10.3389/fpsyg.2022.991337

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: Frontiers

【 摘 要 】

This paper regards the government, opinion leaders, and Internet users as constituting a system for correcting false information, and considers the problem of correcting false information that arises in the aftermath of major emergencies. We use optimal control theory and differential game theory to construct differential game models of decentralized decision-making, centralized decision-making, and subsidized decision-making. The solutions to these models and their numerical simulations show that the government, opinion leaders, and Internet users exercise cost-subsidized decision-making instead of decentralized decision-making. The equilibrium strategies, local optimal benefits, and overall optimal benefits of the system achieve Pareto improvement. Given the goal of maximizing the benefits to the system under centralized decision-making, the equilibrium results are Pareto optimal. The research here provides a theoretical basis for dealing with the mechanism of correcting false information arising from major emergencies, and our conclusions provide methodological support for the government to effectively deal with such scenarios.

【 授权许可】

CC BY