Individual differences could explain the failure in transitive inference formation in pigeons using probabilistic reinforcement

Frontiers in Psychology

article

Héctor Octavio Camarena¹  Oscar García-Leal¹  Zayra Saldaña-Hernández¹  Erick Barrón² 

[1] Department of Environmental Sciences, University of Guadalajara;Basic Psychology Department, University of Guadalajara

关键词: associative strength;    reasoning process;    Probabilistic outcomes;    transitive inference;    task complexity;   

DOI  :  10.3389/fpsyg.2022.1033583

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: Frontiers

【 摘 要 】

In propositional logic, it is stated that “for if A is predicated for every B, and B for every C, A must necessarily be predicated of every C” (Aristotle/trans.). Following a similar logi-cal process, it can be said that If A > B and B > C, then A > C, this is called transitive in-ference (TI). Piaget (1921) developed a verbal task to evaluate TI in children. Subsequent studies adapted this task for animals using a conditioned discrimination between five-terms sequence of stimuli A+B-, B+C-, C+D-, D+E. If subjects prefer B over D during test, it is assumed that TI has occurred. TI can be explained by differences in associative strength as a result of training procedure, instead of a logical conclusion inferred from the stimulus pairs trained. In this experiment, we analyzed the effects of task complexity on TI by using a five-terms sequence of stimuli associated with probabilistic outcomes during training, in pigeons. Thus, both stimuli are reinforced in each pair but with different probability, 0.8 for + stimulus and 0.2 for the – stimulus. We found that performance during C+D- pair is im-paired and preference in the test pair BD is affected. However, this impairment is depend-ent on individual differences in performance in C+D- pair. We compare our findings with previous research and conclude that Pavlovian mechanisms, as well as ordering of stimuli, can account for our findings.

【 授权许可】

CC BY