The role of incentive-based instruments and social equity in conservation conflict interventions

Ecology and Society: a journal of integrative science for resilience and sustainability

article

Sarobidy O. Rakotonarivo¹  Andrew Reid Bell³  Katharine Abernethy¹  Jeroen Minderman⁵  A Bradley Duthie¹  Steve Redpath⁶  Aidan Keane⁷  Henry Travers⁸  Stephanie Bourgeois⁹  Lea-Larissa Moukagni⁹  Jeremy J. Cusack¹  Isabel L. Jones¹  Rocío A. Pozo^1,11  Nils Bunnefeld¹ 

[1] Biological and Environmental Sciences, University of Stirling;École Supérieure des Sciences Agronomiques, Université d'Antananarivo;Department of Environmental Studies, New York University;Institute for Tropical Ecology Research;University of Stirling;University of Aberdeen;School of GeoSciences, University of Edinburgh;Interdisciplinary Centre for Conservation Science, Department of Zoology, University of Oxford;Agence Nationale des Parcs Nationaux;Centro de Modelación y Monitoreo de Ecosistemas, Universidad Mayor;Pontificia Universidad Católica de Valparaíso

关键词: conservation conflict;    human behavior;    human–elephant conflict;    human–wildlife conflict;    interactive game;    monetary incentives;    stakeholder engagement;   

DOI  :  10.5751/ES-12306-260208

学科分类：生物科学（综合）

来源: Resilience Alliance Publications

【 摘 要 】

Conflicts between biodiversity conservation and other human activities are multifaceted. Understanding farmer preferences for various conflict mitigation strategies is therefore critical. We developed a novel interactive game around farmer land management decisions across 18 villages in Gabon to examine responses to three elephant conflict mitigation options: use of elephant deterrent methods, flat-rate subsidy, and agglomeration payments rewarding coordinated action for setting land aside for elephants. We found that all three policies significantly reduced participants’ inclinations to engage in lethal control. Use of deterrents and agglomeration payments were also more likely to reduce decisions to kill elephants in situations where levels of social equity were higher. Only the two monetary incentives increased farmers’ predisposition to provide habitats for elephants, suggesting that incentive-based instruments were conducive to pro-conservation behavior; different subsidy levels did not affect responses. Likewise, neither participants’ socioeconomic characteristics nor their real-life experiences of crop damage by elephants affected game decisions. Killing behavior in the games was 64% lower in villages influenced by protected areas than in villages surrounded by logging concessions, highlighting the need to address conservation conflicts beyond protected areas. Our study shows the importance of addressing underlying social conflicts, specifically equity attitudes, prior to, or alongside addressing material losses.

【 授权许可】

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