A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks

Article

关键词: FINITE POPULATIONS;    ALTRUISM;    DYNAMICS;    GAME;    STABILITY;    EMERGENCE;   

DOI  :  10.1038/nature04605

来源: SCIE

【 摘 要 】

A fundamental aspect of all biological systems is cooperation. Cooperative interactions are required for many levels of biological organization ranging from single cells to groups of animals(1-4). Human society is based to a large extent on mechanisms that promote cooperation(5-7). It is well known that in unstructured populations, natural selection favours defectors over cooperators. There is much current interest, however, in studying evolutionary games in structured populations and on graphs(8-17). These efforts recognize the fact that who-meets-whom is not random, but determined by spatial relationships or social networks(18-24). Here we describe a surprisingly simple rule that is a good approximation for all graphs that we have analysed, including cycles, spatial lattices, random regular graphs, random graphs and scale-free networks(25,26): natural selection favours cooperation, if the benefit of the altruistic act, b, divided by the cost, c, exceeds the average number of neighbours, k, which means b/c > k. In this case, cooperation can evolve as a consequence of 'social viscosity' even in the absence of reputation effects or strategic complexity.

【 授权许可】

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