The Vulnerabilities of Trusted Notifier-Models in Russia: The Case of Netoscope

Media and Communication

article

Liudmila Sivetc¹  Mariëlle Wijermars² 

[1] Faculty of Law, University of Turku;Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Maastricht University

关键词: authoritarian states;    internet governance;    internet sovereignty;    news personalisation;    Netoscope project;    platformisation;    Roskomnadzor;    Russia;    trusted notifier‐model;   

DOI  :  10.17645/mac.v9i4.4237

学科分类：医学（综合）

来源: Cogitatio Press

【 摘 要 】

Current digital ecosystems are shaped by platformisation, algorithmic recommender systems, and news personalisation.These (algorithmic) infrastructures influence online news dissemination and therefore necessitate a reconceptualisationof how online media control is or may be exercised in states with restricted media freedom. Indeed, the degree of mediaplurality and journalistic independence becomes irrelevant when reporting is available but difficult to access; for exam‐ple, if the websites of media outlets are not indexed or recommended by the search engines, news aggregators, or socialmedia platforms that function as algorithmic gatekeepers. Research approaches to media control need to be broadenedbecause authoritarian governments are increasingly adopting policies that govern the internet through its infrastructure;the power they leverage against private infrastructure owners yields more effective—and less easily perceptible—controlover online content dissemination. Zooming in on the use of trusted notifier‐models to counter online harms in Russia, weexamine the Netoscope project (a database of Russian domain names suspected of malware, botnet, or phishing activi‐ties) in which federal censor Roskomnadzor cooperates with, e.g., Yandex (that downranks listed domains in search results),Kaspersky, and foreign partners. Based on publicly available reports, media coverage, and semi‐structured interviews, thearticle analyses the degree of influence, control, and oversight of Netoscope’s participating partners over the database andits applications. We argue that, in the absence of effective legal safeguards and transparency requirements, the politicisednature of internet infrastructure makes the trusted notifier‐model vulnerable to abuse in authoritarian states.

【 授权许可】

CC BY