The Implications of Vertical Strategic Interaction on Green Technology Investment in a Supply Chain

Sustainability

Yongsheng Cheng¹  Simeng Wang²  Xiaoxian Zhang²  Chenchen Zhu² 

[1] Department of Logistics, School of Business Administration, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nanchang 330013, China;School of Management and Economics, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China;

关键词: green technologies;    supply chain;    vertical interaction;    game theory;   

DOI  :  10.3390/su12187441

来源: DOAJ

【 摘 要 】

Numerous studies on supply chains have indicated that vertical strategic interactions usually involve the classical double marginalization problem, leading to a downward distortion in profitability. However, at present, the implications of vertical strategic interactions for green technology investment in a supply chain are not all that clear. In particular, such a vertical interaction not only can translate into profits between different parties, but usually also involves differentiated environmental performance. A question which arises is: who is the right undertaker for green technology investment in a supply chain, the supplier or retailer? To answer this question, we highlight the implications of vertical strategic interaction for green technology investment in a supply chain. To fill this gap, using a game-theoretic approach, we formulate two models: (a) Model M, in which an upstream manufacturer adopts technologies to meet consumer demand; and (b) Model R, where a retailer integrates environmental concerns into their supply chain decisions. We find that the retailer, who is closer to the customer, is the more effective undertaker for green technology investment, as this not only creates higher profitability for both parties, but also achieves a more sustainable scheme for our environment. When green technologies are invested in by the manufacturer, the double marginalization effect not only may downward-distort their economic performance but can also reduce the equilibrium of product greenness.

【 授权许可】

Unknown