Exploiting the Back-Gate Biasing Technique as a Countermeasure Against Power Analysis Attacks

IEEE Access

Trong-Thuc Hoang¹  Anh-Tien Le¹  Ba-Anh Dao¹  Cong-Kha Pham¹  Akira Tsukamoto²  Kuniyasu Suzaki³ 

[1] Department of Information and Network Engineering, University of Electro-Communications (UEC), Tokyo, Japan;National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST), Tokyo, Japan;Technology Research Association of Secure IoT Edge Application based on RISC-V Open Architecture (TRASIO), Tokyo, Japan;

关键词: Side-channel attacks;    differential power analysis;    countermeasure;    back-gate biasing;    FD-SOI;    SOTB;   

DOI  :  10.1109/ACCESS.2021.3057369

来源: DOAJ

【 摘 要 】

Fully depleted silicon-on-insulator (FD-SOI) technology is renowned for its back-gate bias voltage controllability. It allows devices fabricated with FD-SOI technology to be optimized for low power consumption or high performance with proper back-gate biases, depending on the required application. This article proposes using the back-gate biasing technique in novel countermeasures against power analysis attacks. Theoretical explanations are discussed, and realistic differential power analysis (DPA) attacks, targeting AES-128 encryption on a 65-nm STOB 32-bit RISC-V microcontroller, are conducted to justify the proposed idea. The experimental results show that when compared with applying no bias, applying our first proposal, which involves using forward back-gate bias, not only improves the test device performance but also enhances its resistance to DPA attacks. Moreover, vulnerability to DPA attacks is kept unchanged when a reverse back-gate bias is applied to achieve low power consumption. The DPA resistance is even more vital when combining the back-gate bias technique with a lower supply voltage. The number of power traces required to retrieve the secret key successfully increases by 14.5 times in the best case. Even better DPA resistance can be obtained when the back-gate bias of the targeted microcontroller is dynamically randomized, as suggested by our second proposal of a random dynamic back-gate bias (RDBB). When RDBB is applied, the number of power traces required to retrieve the secret key successfully significantly increases by 33.4 times.

【 授权许可】

Unknown