The Independence of Banks Internal Auditors from Banks’ Executives

Ovidius University Annals: Economic Sciences Series

Rebeka Ribaj¹  Valbona Cinaj² 

[1] Ryerson University;University of Tirana;

关键词: internal auditor;    bank;    independence;    regulation;   

DOI  :  

来源: DOAJ

【 摘 要 】

Are internal auditors independent of banks’ executives? In the reality, what happens to the activity of auditors is described as "isolated activities” or at least “unobservable” for the rest of the organization except bank executives. Banks’ internal auditors operate based on a legal framework that is always improving, but in the meantime, the concern of their independence continues to be present evidenced even through interviews conducted with them for this paper. Internal Auditors have weakened their independence from Banks’ Executives because of being under pressure of keeping their job position. The point is that threats to independence are indirect and difficult to identify and measure. Subsequently, the control of the movement and autonomy of internal auditors can't be founded uniquely on consistency with legitimate and administrative acts. This paper infers that autonomy in the dynamic of inward examiners ensure the monetary soundness of banks and thus their customers and different partners. In the end, there are some conclusions and recommendations for enhancing the independence of internal auditors.

【 授权许可】

Unknown