La critique de l’esse intentionale par Guillaume d’Ockham

Methodos

关键词: Brentano;    in-existent object;    intentio;    species;    object of intellection;    Thomas of Aquinas;   

DOI  :  10.4000/methodos.3687

来源: DOAJ

【 摘 要 】

When Brentano has introduced his notion of in-existent objects he said that he followed medieval theories. Generally it is considered that the reference was to the intentiones with a certain type of existence, as developed by scotists. In fact there were many medieval debates on the problem of intention, in particular from the middle of the XIIIth century to the middle of fourteenth. Here we’ll try to give an idea of these debates from the most radical criticism by William of Ockham of any notion of esse intentionale. So, we begin to recall the main positions, by Albert the Great, Thomas of Aquinas, Duns Scot and several followers of him, which have introduced intentiones with a certain type of existence (esse intentionale) in the processes of sensible perception and apperception (species), and at the end of intellection (object of intellection). We emphasize the importance of scotist distinction between intuitive knowledge and abstractive knowledge. Then we show the criticism by Ockham of any esse intentionale. This criticism is immediately radical for all the sorts of species. But for the object of intellection Ockham begins to keep some aspects of the scotist solution, and consider the object of intellection as a fictive entity, a fictum, with a special type of existence which he calls esse objectivum. With this solution he is in contradiction with his own principle of economy which he often uses, and this principle is returned against him by some of his opponents. So in a second moment Ockham adopts a more radical position and considers the act of intellection as the sign of the intellected thing; as a result he refutes the existence of any object of intellection different from the thing.

【 授权许可】

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