期刊论文详细信息
Religions
God, Moral Requirements, and the Limits of Freedom
LauraW. Ekstrom1 
[1] Department of Philosophy, William & Mary, Williamsburg, VA 23187, USA;
关键词: problem of evil;    James Sterba;    divine obligations;    Richard Swinburne;    free will;   
DOI  :  10.3390/rel12050285
来源: DOAJ
【 摘 要 】

This article addresses James Sterba’s recent argument for the conclusion that God’s existence is incompatible with the degree and amount of evil in the world. I raise a number of questions concerning the moral principles that Sterba suggests God would be required to follow, as well as with respect to the analogy he draws between the obligations of a just state and the obligations of God. Against Sterba’s proposed justified divine policy of constraint on human freedom, I ask: What would motivate a perfect being to create human beings who imagine, intend, and freely begin to carry out horrific actions that bring harm to other human beings, to nonhuman animals, and to the environment? I argue that the rationale is lacking behind the thought that God would only interfere with the completion of the process of human beings’ bringing to fruition their horrifically harmful intended outcomes, rather than creating beings with different psychologies and abilities altogether. I end by giving some friendly proposals that help to support Sterba’s view that God, by nature, would be perfectly morally good.

【 授权许可】

Unknown   

  文献评价指标  
  下载次数:0次 浏览次数:0次