Manipulating the Public Moods as a Factor in the Inefficiency of Informal Rules

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Abramov Fedir V.¹ 

[1] Candidate of Sciences (Economics), Associate Professor, Associate Professor, Department of General Economic Theory, National Technical University «Kharkiv Polytechnic Institute»;

关键词: formal rules;    informal rules;    public moods;   

DOI  :  

来源: DOAJ

【 摘 要 】

The article is aimed at determining the influence of manipulating the public moods on the efficiency of both formal and informal rules. It is shown that, under favorable conditions, practice of manipulating the public moods can become common. It is identified that the mechanism of formation of the public moods favorable for manipulation differs for cases of small and big game. In the case of a small game, the formation of favorable public moods is carried out passively, due to positive feedback between the spread of the small game and focusing the society on a particular problem. In the case of a big game the actor carries out a targeted formation of favorable public moods. It is proved that manipulating the public moods can have the following negative consequences: reducing the efficiency of both formal and informal rules, inefficient use of resources, and stability of ineffective formal rules. Possible mechanisms for prevention of manipulating the public moods in case of both small and big game are considered.

【 授权许可】

Unknown