期刊论文详细信息
Jisuanji kexue
Rational PBFT Consensus Algorithm with Evolutionary Game
YANG Xin-yu, PENG Chang-gen, YANG Hui, DING Hong-fa1 
[1] 1 College of Mathematics and Statistics,State Key Laboratory of Public Big Data,Guizhou University,Guiyang 550025,China <
关键词: blockchain|reputation mechanism|consensus algorithm|incentive mechanism|evolutionary game;   
DOI  :  10.11896/jsjkx.210900110
来源: DOAJ
【 摘 要 】

Byzantine fault-tolerant algorithm is vital to ensure the distributed system such as blockchain reaching consistency.The performance of algorithm affects the security and stability of the system.In view of the low efficiency and lack of incentive mechanism of existing consensus algorithms,a rational practical Byzantine fault-tolerant consensus algorithm with evolutionary game is proposed.Firstly,the trustworthiness of nodes in the consensus process is determined by node trust evaluation,the reputation value is used as the basis for the consensus enthusiasm of rational nodes,consensus nodes are divided based on reputation value,and the consensus method of node network fragmentation is adopted to improve consensus efficiency;secondly,the evolutionary game model is established for the impact of link dynamics between nodes in the consensus process on the reputation value,and based on the existence of the reputation stabilization strategy,an incentive mechanism based on reputation value rewards is designed to enhance the enthusiasm of consensus nodes to participate in consensus.Simulation results show that the consensus algorithm has a throughput increase of 40%,and the reputation evolution game model designed for nodes has a rapid convergence effect in the consensus process.

【 授权许可】

Unknown   

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