Reconsidering the Security Bound of AES-GCM-SIV

IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology

Yannick Seurin¹  Tetsu Iwata² 

[1] ANSSI, Paris;Nagoya University;

关键词: authenticated encryption;    AEAD;    GCM-SIV;    AES-GCM-SIV;    CAESAR competition;   

DOI  :  10.13154/tosc.v2017.i4.240-267

来源: DOAJ

【 摘 要 】

We make a number of remarks about the AES-GCM-SIV nonce-misuse resistant authenticated encryption scheme currently considered for standardization by the Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG). First, we point out that the security analysis proposed in the ePrint report 2017/168 is incorrect, leading to overly optimistic security claims. We correct the bound and re-assess the security guarantees offered by the scheme for various parameters. Second, we suggest a simple modification to the key derivation function which would improve the security of the scheme with virtually no efficiency penalty.

【 授权许可】

Unknown