Strategic signaling and new technologically superior product introduction: a game-theoretic model with simulation

Technological and Economic Development of Economy

Debora Di Caprio¹  Madjid Tavana²  Francisco J. Santos-Arteaga³ 

[1] Business Information Systems Department, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, University of Paderborn, D-33098 Paderborn, Germany;Business Systems and Analytics Department, Distinguished Chair of Business Analytics, La Salle University, Philadelphia, PA 19141, USA;Department of Mathematics and Statistics, York University, Toronto, M3J 1P3, Canada;

关键词: game theory;    simulations;    product planning;    information sharing;    strategic signaling;    technological improvement;   

DOI  :  10.3846/tede.2018.4531

来源: DOAJ

【 摘 要 】

User acceptance of technology is essential to determine its success. The current paper incorporates the main properties of the technology acceptance models (TAMs) developed by management scholars into a pre-commitment signaling duopolistic framework, where two competing firms must decide the level of technological improvement of the products being introduced. As a result, the corresponding equilibria of the duopolistic technological games will be determined by demand-based factors, providing a novel approach and complementing the current supply-based economic and operational research models developed in the literature. The proposed model will be simulated numerically to illustrate the strategic optimality of the update process of smartphone and tablet characteristics defined by Apple and Samsung as the market developed.

【 授权许可】

Unknown