Coalitional Game Theory Based Value Sharing in Energy Communities

IEEE Access

Antti Keski-Koukkari¹  Amir Safdarian¹  Marius Baranauskas¹  Anna Kulmala¹  Poria Hasanpor Divshali¹ 

[1] VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland, Espoo, Finland;

关键词: Coalitional game theory;    energy community;    optimization problem;    payoff allocation;    prosumer;    redundant constraint;   

DOI  :  10.1109/ACCESS.2021.3081871

来源: DOAJ

【 摘 要 】

This paper presents a coalitional game for value sharing in energy communities (ECs). It is proved that the game is super-additive, and the grand coalition effectively increases the global payoff. It is also proved that the model is balanced and thus, it has a nonempty core. This means there always exists at least one value sharing mechanism that makes the grand coalition stable. Therefore, prosumers will always achieve lower bills if they join to form larger ECs. A counterexample is presented to demonstrate that the game is not convex and value sharing based on Shapley values does not necessarily ensure the stability of the coalition. To find a stabilizing value sharing mechanism that belongs to the core of the game, the worst-case excess minimization concept is applied. In this concept, however, size of the optimization problem increases exponentially with respect to the number of members in EC. To make the problem computationally tractable, the idea of clustering members based on their generation/load profiles and considering the same profile and share for members in the same cluster is proposed here. K-means algorithm is used for clustering prosumers’ profiles. This way, the problem would have several redundant constraints that can be removed. The redundant constraints are identified and removed via the generalized Llewellyn’s rules. Finally, value sharing in an apartment building in the southern part of Finland in the metropolitan area is studied to demonstrate effectiveness of the method.

【 授权许可】

Unknown