Lo statuto metodologico dei contenuti intenzionali

Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia

关键词: mental content;    radical enactivism;    intentionality;    naturalism;    teleosemantics;    theory of explanation;   

DOI  :  10.4453/rifp.2019.0023

来源: DOAJ

【 摘 要 】

The philosophy of mind debate is characterized by increasing consensus regarding a new type of eliminativism, also known as the radical enactivist theory of mind. According to the radical enactivist view, the intentional content of a mental state is empirically undetermined, therefore it cannot figure as part of a naturalistic explanation of behavior. However, although the notion of intentional content is not compatible with any form of ontological naturalism, it is compatible with a form of methodological naturalism. Following Carnap’s semantic analysis of theoretical concepts, it is possible to conceive of intentional mental states as a symbolic vehicles whose meaning can be conventionally established on the basis of empirical observation. In order to support this claim, I refer to a case study on the cognitive functions of somatosensory cortex. This article provides arguments for building an intentional explanation of behavior based on methodological approaches in the natural sciences.

【 授权许可】

Unknown