Knowledge Sharing Willingness and Leakage Risk: An Evolutional Game Model

Sustainability

Yuanfei Kang¹  Qian Li² 

[1] Massey Business School, Massey University, Auckland 0745, New Zealand;School of Economics and Management, Chang’an University, Xi’an 710064, China;

关键词: knowledge sharing willingness;    knowledge leakage;    evolutionary game model;    supply chain relationship;   

DOI  :  10.3390/su11030596

来源: DOAJ

【 摘 要 】

Prior research of knowledge sharing between firms mainly focuses on enabling factors, such as benefits resulting from knowledge sharing, leading to an overlook at barriers. Guided by transaction cost economics and social exchange theory, our study constructed an evolutional game model to analyse the dynamic evolution process of the firm’s knowledge sharing behaviour in a setting of supply chain networks. Using a simulation in our game model, we firstly reveal how a long-term strategy for supply chain partners towards knowledge sharing is determined through reaching an equilibrium between enabling factors (revenue gained in various forms) and impeding factors (knowledge leakage) in a dynamic process. Secondly, our analysis demonstrates that the competition or rivalry side of the “co-opetition” relationship acts as the major barrier for knowledge sharing due to the sharer’s concern of knowledge leakage. Thirdly, our model has identified knowledge relevancy as the inherent property of knowledge and the firm’ ability of knowledge inference as two important factors influencing knowledge leakage.

【 授权许可】

Unknown